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 Benjamin de Vet, Monica Poletti, and Bram
Wauters examine the limits of party members’ electoral loyalty. They explain
how strategic considerations, ideological discontent, and negative leadership
evaluations lie at the basis of decisions to cast a defecting vote.
One of the perceived advantages of having many grassroots members is that they supply
political parties with a steady electoral base. Not only are members seen as
‘ambassadors’ on the ground that endorse the party in their everyday social contacts:
they are also assumed to be loyal voters themselves, who support the party in both good
times and bad.
The electoral loyalty of party members should, however, not be taken for granted. Based
on survey data of around 9,000 party members in the UK and Flanders (Belgium), we find
that some vote for another party than the one they are member of. In Flemish parties,
the percentage of disloyal members in the federal elections of 2010 and 2014 lies
between 4% and 8%. In the UK, there is more variation. Larger parties, like the
Conservatives, Labour, and the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) saw between 4% to 5% of
their members casting a defecting vote in the General Elections of 2015. This percentage
is much larger in smaller parties like the Green Party (15.8 %), the Liberal Democrats
(12.1%) and to a lesser extent UKIP (6.9 %). Virtually every defecting member of the
Green party and half of the Lib Dems voted for Labour, whereas almost every defecting
member in UKIP voted for the Tories. Note that our analysis only looks at members who
actually voted for a (different) party, not at those who abstained from voting (which very
few party members did in both countries).
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Already from these numbers, strategic voting considerations seem to be an important
factor at play. Party members might not sincerely vote for the party they genuinely
prefer, but choose to vote for a party with a better chance of obtaining seats or being
pivotal in coalition negotiations. Our explanatory analysis confirms the important role of
strategic considerations, at least in terms of smaller parties being the victim of such
judgments. This effect is, however, only found in the UK where its majoritarian electoral
system decreases the likelihood for small parties to obtain seats, compared to Belgium’s
proportional PR-system.
Strategic considerations aside, members’ disloyal voting behaviour is also caused by
ideological concerns. First of all, members vote for other parties out of disagreement
with their own parties’ ideological positions. Party members who perceive a large
distance between their own and their party’s ideological stances (measured on a general
left-right scale) are more likely to cast a defecting vote. Also the ideological appeal of
neighbouring parties is important. Members who perceive a small distance between
their own and other parties’ positions on a left-right scale are more prone to casting a
defecting vote. Even though the fragmented multi-party system in Flanders decreases
the ideological distance between parties, the effects of ideological concerns on members’
voting behaviour are equally substantial in British parties.
Lastly, leadership evaluations matter as well. In both countries, the more negatively a
party member evaluates his or her party leader, the more likely it is that he or she casts a
defecting vote. For members who are dissatisfied with the party leader, for instance
because of his/her policy preferences or a member’s psychological attachment to
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another aspirant leader, voting for another party seems a tempting and less radical
option than leaving the party. To some extent they remain loyal to the ‘party brand’,
perhaps in the hope that one day the leader will resign. They might, however, once or as
long as the party leader is in function, cast a defecting vote. Here again, we find a similar
effect for British and Flemish parties.
Although a majority of party members do vote for their own party, our analysis shows
that the loyalty of party members is neither absolute nor unconditional. A relevant share
does defect at the ballot box, which poses a number of practical implications for parties.
The strategic considerations of British members should be the least worrisome. Many
‘defecting’ members would probably vote for their own party if they lived in a
constituency where the chances of winning a seat would be higher. As their voting
decisions seems a pragmatic choice rather than one out of disagreement, they can
possibly still act as ‘party ambassadors’, although they might find it more satisfactorily to
do so online or in another electoral district.
More problematic is when party members defect because they have negative attitudes
towards the party leadership, are displeased with the ideological direction the party is
heading, or are attracted to ideologically close competitors. When party members are, in
other words, dissatisfied with the current state of affairs within parties, they might not
only deny them their own vote, but might also convince other party supporters to do the
same. This could have a direct effect in marginal constituencies in majoritarian systems
like Britain, but also in multiparty systems with small electoral margins like Flanders.
More plausible, perhaps, is the long-term danger that if members remain dissatisfied for
an extended period of time, they might consider leaving the party altogether.
Notwithstanding some periodic ups and downs, this could further contribute to the
widespread declining membership trend in Western Europe.
____________
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